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FREDERICK  SCHAUER
Richard H. Fallon,  Jr.  *
Over many  years  of reading Fred Schauer's  work, and learning
from it, I  have sometimes  agreed and sometimes  disagreed with  his
positions, but always I have felt challenged and engaged.  In this essay,
I  want to pay  tribute by ruminating  on some  of Schauer's  themes.
Among the upshots of my ruminations is a question whether several of
his most important and influential ideas may not be in some  tension
with one another.
My ruminations  mainly concern four of Schauer's texts.  I begin
with  a brief, largely uncritical  appreciation  of an  essay  entitled  The
Second-Best First  Amendment,'  in which I first encountered-Schauer's im-
portant, recurring theme that legal rules have a crucial role as devices
for the allocation of decisionmaking power.  Subsequent sections con-
sider  whether  some  of  Schauer's  well-known jurisprudential  writ-
ings-notably his influential book Playing by  the Rules 2 and his article
Rules and the Rule of  Law,3 which advance a theory that he labels "pre-
sumptive positivism"-are  consistent with the account of rules  as de-
vices for the allocation of power that is offered in  The Second-Best First
Amendment.  Although any surface inconsistency could probably be re-
paired, I conclude  that Schauer's jurisprudential theory of presump-
tive  positivism  would  need  to  be  both  expanded  and  partly
compromised for all of his central claims to be made fully consistent
with one another.  I then reflect critically on Schauer's recent, impor-
*  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  University.  I  am  gratefil  to  Kirsten  Mayer  for
research and editorial  assistance.
1  Frederick  Schauer,  The Second-Best First  Amendmen  31 WM.  & MAR  L. REv.  1
(1989)  [hereinafter  Schauer, Second-Best First  Amendment].
2  FREDERICK SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RuLEs: A  PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION  OF
RULE-BASED  DECISION-MAING  IN LAW AND  IN LIFE  (1991)  [hereinafter SCHAUER,  PLAY-
ING  BY THE  RuLEs].
3  Frederick Schauer,  Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HAv. J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y 645
(1991)  [hereinafter Schauer, Rules].NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
tant  article,  Amending  the  Presuppositions of a  Constitution. 4  Among
other  observations,  this  discussion  yields  the  question  whether
Schauer's  insights  about the  "presuppositions" of our constitutional
order-to  cite  the  concept that  his article  has helpfully introduced
into debates about the theory of constitutional  amendment-accord
with the semantic theory that underlies some of his claims about rule-
based decisionmaking  in law.
Although I shall raise some other issues along the way, my princi-
pal complaint, if I have one, may be that Schauer has too many good
ideas  for all of them to fit together neatly.
I.  THE  SECOND-BEST  FIRST AMENDMENT
The Second-Best First  Amendment5 develops an important theme that
resonates  throughout  Schauer's subsequent  writing:  There  is  a vital
distinction between a substantive or regulatory rule-a prescription to
act or  refrain from acting in  a particular way-and  the background
values thatjustify the prescription. 6  For example, it might be the pur-
pose  of the First Amendment to respect individual autonomy, to pro-
mote the discovery of truth, or to support a well-functioning political
democracy.7  But  the rules  implementing  the First Amendment  sel-
dom direct that cases should be resolved on the basis of an all-things-
considered  assessment of what would be  best in light of underlying
values.  We have, instead, rules established by such well-known cases as
New  York  Times  Co.  v.  Sullivan 8  and  Brandenburg  v.  Ohio 9  that rather
rigidly constrain decisionmakers.  Sometimes the constraint is painful.
Once  laid  down,  a First Amendment  rule  may occasionally  require
decisionmakers  to  reach less  than optimal results in particular  cases,
as measured  by the values underlying  the rule.'0
The  insight can  be  generalized.  Legal  rules,  Schauer suggests,
are  inherently  second-best.  An  ideal  decisionmaker,  permitted  to
make all-things-considered judgments, would be able to reach the best
possible result in every case.  Rules, by contrast, bind a decisionmaker
to prescriptions laid down in advance by rule-making  authorities act-
4  Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions  of a Constitution, in RESPONDING
TO  IMPERFECTION:  THE  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT  145
(Sanford  Levinson  ed.,  1995)  [hereinafter Schauer,  Amending the Presuppositions].
5  Schauer,  Second-Best First  Amendment, supra note 1.
6  See id. at 11-12.
7  See id. at 4.
8  376 U.S. 254  (1964).
9  395  U.S. 444  (1969)  (per curiam).
10  See Schauer,  Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 1, at 7, 13.
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ing with less  than perfect knowledge  and foresight."  It is therefore
an endemic feature of rules  that they yield less  than optimal results.
Nonetheless,  there are good  reasons why we  sometimes  want rules,
despite  their inherent deficiencies  as  measured  against  the  ideal.12
Among  these  reasons  is  that all  human  decisionmaking,  including
that by judges, is prone  to error.  And sometimes it is relatively pre-
dictable  that judges, or other decisionmakers,  will be likely to  make
particular  kinds of errors-overestimating  certain  kinds  of harm  or
risk,  for  example-if  authorized  to  make  all-things-considered
decisions'
3
Schauer's point is a deep one.  Having rules confers benefits, but
the benefits always come at a price.  One of the questions that Schauer
presses  is when  this price is  worth paying, in light of the alternative
price that we would pay for not having rules.14  As he  takes pains to
point out, it would be impossible to provide a general  answer to this
overbroad and imprecise question.  But a crucial consideration is that
legal  rules  are  devices  for the  allocation  of power.15  Although  an
ideal  decisionmaker would be  able  to make  better all-things-consid-
ered decisions than rule-based decisionmaking permits, we know that
actual  decisionmakers  frequently are  far less than  ideal.  Partly  as  a
result, modem constitutional doctrine  does not, for example, gener-
ally  trust  police  officers  to  make  all-things-considered  judgments
about whether it would be desirable  to conduct warrantless  searches
of houses.'6  We do not trust legislatures to make all-things-considered
judgments about whether to restrict the expression  of obnoxious  or
even dangerous ideas in a public forum.  And we do not trust judges,
or even Justices of the Supreme  Court, to make all-things-considered
judgments about whether anyone should be punishable for treason in
the absence of "the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or... Confession  in open Court."17
A common  form  of legal  analysis  condemns  "formalist" adher-
ence  to rules in cases in which an all-things-considered assessment of
relevant  values  would  dictate  a  different  result.' 8  But  Schauer  re-
minds us that it is impossible to have the benefits of all-things-consid-
ered  decisionmaking  without the  costs.  To  authorize  an  official-
11  See id. at 16-17.
12  See id. at 14-17.
13  See iii
14  See id. at 9,  14.
15  See id. at 14 n.46, 20 n.53.
16  See id. at 15.
17  U.S.  CONST.  art.  I,  § 3,  cl. 1.
18  See Frederick Schauer, Forma/ism, 97 YAI.  LJ.  509  (1988).
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whether  a  police  officer  or a judge-to  disregard  a rule is  to shift
power enormously from the rule-maker or system designer to the offi-
cial with front-line decisionmaking  responsibility.19
In my view,  The-Second Best First  Amendment is  a small  gem of an
article.  It provides, first, a plausible account, elaborated in Schauer's
later work,  of the  nature of rule-based  decisionmaking.  Within this
account, rules  are "entrenched generalizations" 20 with  some capacity
to preclude those to whom they are addressed from making decisions
on  an all-things-considered  basis or  even  on  the basis  of the rule's
background justifications. 21  If rules were not "opaque" to their back-
ground justifications to  at least some extent-if they could be disre-
garded whenever a decisionmaking  official  thought that applying the
rule  would yield  a sub-optimal  result-they would  not be  "rules"  in
any meaningful sense.  Second, The Second-Best First  Amendment situates
rule-based decisionmaking in a legal system, which is itself located in a
broader culture, and thus invites attention to questions of where deci-
sionmaking authority of different kinds ought to be located.2 2  Among
other things, Schauer's perspective provides an important counterbal-
ance  to prominent theories,  such  as  that of Ronald  Dworkin,23  that
are idealized and judge-centered.  It is small exaggeration  to say that
Dworkin  develops his theory by assuming the vantage point of a mor-
ally and intellectually ideal judge, Hercules, who displays an incessant,
personal preoccupation with achieving a body of law that is consistent
in principle.  In considering issues of institutional design, Schauer is
right to remind us that not every judge possesses herculean capacities
and, what  is more, that judges  are  only one  among many  classes  of
decisionmakers to whom legal rules are addressed.  Dworkin's "inter-
pretive protestantism"24 may at least look more problematic once  the
lens is widened and the full set of legal  decisionmakers is seen in life-
like detail.
I could, of course, raise some quibbles and deprecations concern-
ing The Second-Best First  Amendment.  In its emphasis on the function of
19  See Schauer,  Second-Best First Amendment, supra note  1, at 20 n.53.
20  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULES,  supra note 2, at  191.
21  See Schauer,  Second-Best First  Amendment, supra note  1, at 10-12.
22  See id. at 14-23.
23  See, e.g.,  RONALD  DWORKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE  (1986)  [hereinafter  DWORKIN,  LAW'S
EMPIRE];  RONALD  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  (1977)  [hereinafter DWORKIN,
TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY].
24  See DOWRKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE,  supra note 23, at 413  (characterizing his theory as
embracing  "a  protestant attitude  that makes  each citizen  responsible for imagining
what his society's public commitments to principle  are, and what these commitments
require  in new circumstances").
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rules in allocating power and determining action by law-applying offi-
cials, the article may pay insufficient heed to other functions of rules,
such as facilitating coordinated  activity and providing clear notice of
rights  and  obligations.25  When  these  functions  are  taken  into  ac-
count, the notions of the "ideal" and the "second-best" become more
complex than Schauer expressly acknowledges.  In addition, many of
the article's  best insights,  though presented  in a fresh and arresting
way, have  close  analogues  in  previous  work contrasting  "rules" with
"standards."26  Finally, as I shall  discuss further below,27  I think that
there may be somewhat broader scope for the "interpretation" of legal
rules than some of Schauer's formulations (even if not his formal posi-
tion)  may suggest.
But the  quibbles  are  little  more than  that.  The Second-Best First
Amendment provides  a valuable  template  for thinking about how first
amendment doctrine ought to be structured and, more generally, for
thinking about the role of rules in law.
II.  PRESUMPTIVE  PosITvIsM
Since  The Second-Best First  Amendment, Schauer has continued  his
exploration of the nature and functions  of rules.  His most extensive
discussion comes in an important and broad-ranging  book, Playing  by
the Rules: A  Philosophical  Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in
Law and in Life.28  The book is richly illuminating along many dimen-
sions.  In  particular, Schauer  expands  his account of what rules are
and how they work, and he has much to say about how different kinds
of rules can and must function in law.  In both Playing y the Rules and
a  roughly  contemporaneous  article,  Rules  and  the  Rule  of Law,29
Schauer  presents  his most important  claims about  legal rules  as  as-
pects of a theory that he calls "presumptive positivism."30  In an earlier
writing, I spoke enthusiastically of presumptive positivism.31  More re-
cently, I have had second thoughts.  Although I continue to think that
Schauer provides a valuable  perspective  on the nature and functions
of legal rules, I have grown doubtful that presumptive positivism suc-
25  Schauer refers to such  functions, but only fleetingly.  See Schauer, Second-Best
First  Amendmen  supra note  1, at 14.
26  See,  e.g., Duncan Kennedy,  Form and Substance in Private  Law Adjudication, 89
HARv.  L. R'v.  1685  (1976).
27  See infra Part  V.
28  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULES,  supra note 2.
29  Schauer, Rules, supra note 3.
30  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULS, supra note  2, at 196-206.
31  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,  Common Law Court or Council of Reision  2, 101 YALE
L.J. 949  (1992)  (book review).
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ceeds as a general jurisprudential theory.3 2  To express my reservation
only slightly more  concretely, I question whether presumptive positiv-
ism offers sufficiently clear and useful answers to the particular ques-
tions about the nature of law that it sets out to answer.
A.  Rules in Law
Schauer  argues  persuasively  that  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  a
legal  system  that is  not largely an "affair of rules"33 -rules  that have
the  allocation  of power  as  a  central  function.  In  elaborating  this
claim,  Schauer distinguishes  two types of rules.  'Jurisdictional  rules"
assign power to render particular kinds of decisions.3 4  For example,
legislatures are empowered by rule to enact statutes regulating private
conduct, and courts are given responsibility for adjudicating disputes.
In contrast with jurisdictional rules establishing decisionmaking  insti-
tutions, substantively constraining or "regulative" rules  determine the
particular  decisions  that duly constituted decisionmaking  institutions
must make.35  The concept of law or of a legal system, Schauer inter-
estingly argues, does not require "a substantial array of outcome-deter-
mining  rules  sharply  limiting  the  decisionmakers'  judgment  or
discretion."36  But while law does not require regulatory rules, neither,
Schauer argues,  does it forbid  them.  Substantive  or regulatory  rules
are  common in our legal  system and, as suggested in  The Second-Best
First  Amendment, frequently bind judges and other decisionmakers.  Or
do they?
Building  on  ideas  that  he  attributes  to  Ronald  Dworkin  and
Duncan Kennedy,37 Schauer sketches  (for the purpose of addressing)
a forceful  challenge to the notion that rules actually bind judges as a
32  Cf Ruth Gavison,  Comment: Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14  HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 727, 730-31  (1991)  (distinguishing a theory of rules and their role from a
theory of law).
33  Schauer,  Rules, supra note 3, at 651; see SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULEs, supra
note 2,  at 168.
34  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RULES,  supra note 2,  at 169-74;  see also Schauer,
Rules, supra note 3, at 651-54 (discussing empowering  rules that create decisionmak-
ing environments).
35  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULEs,  supra note 2, at  171-74;  see also Schauer,
Rules, supra note 3, at 651  (discussing "regulatory" rules).
36  Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 654; see also id. at 657  ("[A] system  employing
empowering  rules but leaving  substantive  decisionmaking  authority  largely uncon-
strained  by external  legal  rules seems  both  pragmatically  plausible  and accepted  as
'law'  within the world in which we now exist."); SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULES,  supra
note  2, at 172.
37  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RULES,  supra note  2,  at 200-02; Schauer,  Rules,
supra note  3, at 667-77.
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matter of law.  The challenge  begins  with an  empirical  observation:
there are  cases,  including  well-known  cases,38  in which judges  have
rejected or modified an applicable legal rule based on the perception
that applying the rule would be unacceptable in light of other norms
that are generally recognized within the society.39  Nor, Schauer sug-
gests, can such cases be dismissed as aberrant instances ofjudicial de-
fault  of  legal  duty.  Cases  in  which  judges  have  held  "local,"4°
applicable rules not binding are too numerous, and many of them are
too much respected  as paradigms  of good judging, for this explana-
tion to work.41  Looking at cases such as these, others have suggested
that what are commonly taken to be legal "rules" are really no more
than  "rules  of thumb."42  Unlike  "rules" as  Schauer  uses  the  term,
"rules of thumb" do not purport  to block all-things-considered  deci-
sionmaking on the facts of any particular case.43
38  Schauer structures much of his discussion around Riggs v. Palmer,  22 N.E.  188
(N.Y. 1889), which held that a killer could not inherit under the will of his victim, and
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161  A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960),  which held that a con-
sumer's waiver of a warranty on an automobile  was invalid, even though not fraudu-
lently obtained, because  enforcement would be contrary to public policy.
39  See SCHAUER, PLAYING  BY THE RULES,  supra note  2, at 200-02.
40  Schauer introduces the concept of "locality" to resolve  some otherwise appar-
ent conflicts  occurring within  complex  rule systems.  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE
RULES,  supra note 2, at 188-91.  He relies heavily on an example to elucidate what he
means:
Consider the difference between two rules, one requiring all  drivers to drive
safely at all times and another setting a minimum speed of 40 miles per hour
on a certain  stretch of limited-access  highway...  [A]Ithough many cases
can be imagined in which  two  (or more)  potentially  conflicting rules are
applicable,  one of the rules may  seem more applicable, or, to put it better,
more  directly applicable.  The rule that is  less general,  and applicable  to a
smaller number  of events,  seems  to  be  more  applicable  to  the  events  to
which it does  apply.
Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).  According to Schauer, "for rules to operate as rues
within a system of rules  ....  they must be treated as entrenched  generalizations with
respect to other [less directly applicable]  rules as well, and it is that relationship that
the idea of local priority seeks  to capture."  Id. at 190-91  (emphasis in original).
Although I cannot develop the point here, I find the metaphor of local priority-
for I take it to  be no more  than a metaphor-somewhat  more mysterious  and less
analytically helpful than Schauer supposes it to be.
41  See id. at 200.
42  According  to Schauer, "rules of thumb" are prescriptive  generalizations  that
offer "no independent  reasons for decision  when  they  indicate  results other than
those  indicated  by  the  direct  application  of  [their  underlying  justifications]."
Schauer, Rules, supra note 3,  at 648.
43  See id. at 648-49.
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Against  this challenge to the claim that our legal  system  (among
others) makes important use of regulatory rules that forbid or at least
restrict all-things-considered  decisionmaking,  Schauer  offers his  the-
ory of presumptive  positivism:44  Rules bind, but only up  to a point.
Or, in  Schauer's  vocabulary,  the  force  of those  legal  rules  that are
distinctively recognized  as such under accepted rules of recognition 45
or similar "pedigree" tests  is  "presumptive"  only.46  Somewhat  more
specifically,  the  prescriptive  force  of legal  rules  is  capable  of being
overcome  in  cases in which  the moral, political,  or practical  costs of
applying a rule would be too large and unacceptable. 47  In such cases,
Schauer  argues,  the  legal  rule  ceases  to bind, and a judge  or other
decisionmaker  is authorized to do whatever seems best to him or her,
in light of the full range of moral and other norms recognized  within
the society.
Among  its  virtues,  Schauer's  theory  of presumptive  positivism
draws  attention  to, and begins  the  process  of providing  a plausible
reconciliation of, what I take to be two widely shared understandings
of competent lawyers.  On the  one hand, rules-largely as a result of
their  literal  or  semantic  applicability-frequently  determine  out-
comes.  On the other hand, literalism  has its limits; good judges will
often, if not usually, find a way to avoid outcomes that would involve
serious  injustices  or frustrate important public policies.
Nevertheless,  Schauer's  account leaves  open  a number of ques-
tions, one of which seems to me to be of foremost importance: are the
weight and nature of the considerations  adequate to justify a rejection
or modification  of a legal  rule,  or the  recognition  of an exception,
44  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE RuLEs,  supra note 2,  at 203-06;  Schauer,  Rules,
supra note  3, at 674-79.
45  The term "rule of recognition," which  can be traced to H.LA. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW 94-95  (2d ed. 1994),  refers to "common public standards" accepted by a
legal system's relevant officials for determining what the law is.  Id.
46  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE RuLEs,  supra note 2, at 204  ("Presumptive positiv-
ism is a way of describing the interplay between  a pedigreed  subset of rules and the
full  (and  non-pedigreeable)  normative  universe,  such  that  the  former
is  . . .presumptively  controlling in  [a]  not-necessarily-epistemic  sense  of presump-
tive.");  Schauer, Rules, supra note  3,  at 674-77.
47  Schauer  has  offered  slightly  varying  specifications  of the  conditions  under
which the presumption for applying an applicable legal rule might be overcome.  See
SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RuLEs, supra note 2, at 196  (referring to considerations  of
"exceptional strength,");  id.  (calling for displacement in  light of "particularly exigent
reasons");  id. at 205  ("[T]he rule will be set aside when  the result it indicates  is egre-
giously at odds with the result that is indicated by [a]  larger and more morally accept-
able set of values."); Schauer, Rules, supra  note 3, at 676 (stating that a result indicated
by a  rule should  be reached  in  the  absence  of "a reason  of great strength  for not
reaching  [the]  result").
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themselves  specified by  law?48  If  so, Schauer's position  could be  ex-
pressed by saying that the applicability of a particular rule can be de-
termined  only in light of the whole body of law-a position  not far
from Ronald Dworkin's.  But this account would substantially  dimin-
ish the  discontinuity  between  rule-bound  and non-rule-bound  deci-
sionmaking that the theory of presumptive positivism seems intended
to portray.  Schauer appears to reject it.
49
Another possibility  is  that the  considerations  adequate  to over-
ride an otherwise  applicable  rule are not in fact specified by law: the
judge  or  other decisionmaker  is  empowered  to  make  an  all-things-
considered judgment of when, in his or her view, the  costs of obedi-
ence would be too great.50  This position, however, would bring diffi-
culties of its own.  Among other things, it would generate an obvious
tension between  presumptive positivism, which holds that judges are
excused from their legal  obligations  to follow  the rules  in  cases  in
which  the costs  of rule-following would appear  (to them)  to be  too
high, and another of Schauer's recurring  themes, much emphasized
in The Second-Best First  Amendment, that perhaps the central function of
legal  rules is to allocate power.  If a principal purpose of legal rules is
to allocate power, and in particular to bind judges based on a distrust
of their  capacity  to  make  sound,  all-things-considered  decisions,  it
would be somewhat odd to authorize judges to reject substantive rules
as unacceptable in cases that the judges believe  to be of high conse-
quence, but not in more trivial cases.51
48  See GeraldJ. Postema, Positivism, I Presume?  ...  Comments on Schauer's "Rules and
the Rule of Law", 14 HARv.  J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y 797,  813 n.23  (1991)  (raising a similar
question).  Schauer appears not to regard the question as particularly important.  See
SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE RULES,  sup a  note 2, at 205--06
Whether we call [the] array of overriding factors 'law' or not is a dispute that
is to some extent terminological.  It is also  a dispute, however, that goes to
the rhetoric of legality, to the extent to which legal decision-makers  relying
on a non-pedigreeable  universe of social norms shall when doing so be but-
tressed  by the  connotations  of deduction,  constraint,  and limited  domain
suggested by the word 'law.'  I will explore this question no further here ....
In Schauer, Rules, supra note  3, at 677 n.70, Schauer  responds directly to Professor
Postema's  question.  Schauer frames the issue as  one contested by Ronald Dworkin
and Melvin Eisenberg and observes that Eisenberg  "seems to be correct" that judges
may displace pedigreed legal rules in service  of any of "the full set of normative pro-
positions or sources accepted by the society at large."  Id.
49  See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3,  at 677 n.70.
50  This seems to be Schauer's  view.  See id.
51  See MargaretJane Radin, Presumptive  Positivism  and Trivial Cases, 14 HARv.J.L. &
PUB.  POL'Y 823,  832  (1991).  Curiously, Schauer himself has made a similar criticism
of the theory that he calls  "rule-sensitive particularism," under which
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There might of course be other reasons, not fundamentally based
in concerns about likely judicial error and a desire to allocate power
in  such  a way  as  to  achieve  "second-best"  results,  for giving judges
more authority in  relatively important cases  than in  relatively unim-
portant cases.  These might include interests in predictability and ease
of decisionmaking, which  might be thought to be outweighed in mo-
mentous but not trivial disputes,5 2 as well as a desire to preserve public
confidence  that judges as much as  citizens are subject to the rule of
law.  Nonetheless, if rules bind only in trivial cases, the force of one of
Schauer's  central  claims  would  be  significantly  undermined.  Or
would it?
If rules allocate power by limiting the authority of decisionmakers
to make all-things-considered judgments, there is clearly no reason to
think that all legal decisionmakers should be afforded equal authority
to reject,  or  create  an exception  to,  an  otherwise  applicable  rule.53
Most of us want  cops  on  the  beat simply to  obey duly propounded
constitutional  rules.54  We  might  be  willing  to  trust judges  with  a
somewhat greater authority to make  all-things-considered judgments
rules are rules of thumb in the sense of being transparent  to their substan-
tive justifications,  but in  which  their very existence  and  effect  as rules  of
thumb become a factor to be considered  in determining whether the rules
should be set aside when the results they indicated diverged from the results
indicated  by direct application of their substantive justifications.
Schauer, Second-Best First  Amendment, supra note 1, at 20 n.53.  According to Schauer:
If the virtues of "ruleness" are seen to reside primarily in [distrust of particu-
lar decisionmakers],  then the difference between rule-sensitive particularism
and  the  stronger  form  of  rule-based  decisionmaking  I  have  been  us-
ing ...  becomes enormously important.  If we are guided  by a concern that
certain  decisionmakers  should  not  be  making certain  kinds of decisions,
such  as the decision that this instance of speech is  not one  that serves the
purpose  of having freedom of speech,  then authorizing  a decisionmaker  to
determine  whether this  is  the  kind of decision  with  respect  to which  she
should not be trusted appears, although not logically inconceivable,  never-
theless  psychologically  bizarre.  . . .If we  do not trust a decisionmaker  to
determine x,  then we can hardly trust that decisionmaker  to determine that
this  is  a case  in  which the  reasons  for disabling that  decisionmaker  from
determining  x either do not apply or are  outweighed.
Id.; see also SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RULES, supra note 2, at 98.
52  The characterization  comes from Radin, supra note 51.
53  See Schauer, Rules, supra  note 3, at 679-91; Schauer, Second-Best First  Amendment,
supra note 1, at 14-22.
54  See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 684; cf Schauer, Second-Best First  Amendment;
supra note 1, at 15 (noting widespread reluctance to entrust "members of the Chicago
Police  Department"  with  the  authority  to  decide  on  an  all-things-considered  basis
"whether to remove an offensive painting of a popular former mayor from the walls of
the School of the Art Institute").
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about  what would  be  best. 5 5  And  we  might,  I suppose,  think  that
judges of the highest court within ajurisdiction, such as the Supreme
Court, should  have even  greater  lawful  authority  to reject a rule or
craft a  new one in order  to achieve  an important  good  or avoid  a
serious harm.5 6
Resisting  Dworkin's  sometimes  titanic  influence,57  Schauer
presses  the  idea-which  has  seemed  obvious  to  such  positivists  as
H.L.A. Hart,58 but seems implicitly to be rejected out of hand in much
constitutional  theorizing-that  courts  might best be  understood  as
sometimes exercising lawmaking power within our legal system.59  But
what kind  of lawmakers  might  courts,  and  especially  the  Supreme
Court, be?
Consider two possibilities, each based on an analogy.  Article V of
the Constitution authorizes "We the People," acting pursuant to speci-
fied forms,  to make  new constitutional  rules in a way that is  at least
broadly unbounded by substantive law.60  So let us assume, for sake of
argument, that "We the People," when engaged in constitutional law-
making through  the prescribed  forms, can make law of any substan-
55  See Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment,  supra note 1,  at 17-21.
56  See Schauer, Rules, supra note  3, at  687; Schauer,  Second-Best First  Amendmen
supra note  1, at 18-21.  Schauer  is emphatic,  however, that such  a judgment, if it
could  reasonably be  reached at all,  could not be  reached "acontextually";  it would
need to reflect a judgment, amorng other matters, that the people likely to be judges
of the highest court would be likely  to exercise  their  revisionary power in laudable
ways.  See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 689.
57  Schauer frames his theory of presumptive positivism at least partly in response
to  what he characterizes  as Dworkin's  "powerful attack on  [other forms  of]  positiv-
ism."  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RULES,  supra note 2, at 200.
58  See HART,  supra note 45.
59  See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 682-91.
60  The Constitution purports to preclude possible amendments aimed at altering
the states' equal representation in the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. V, and the Constitu-
tion as originally enacted barred the adoption of certain amendments  affecting slav-
ery and the slave trade before  1808,  id.
A  lively debate  exists  as  to  whether  there  are  other substantive  limits  on the
amendment authority.  For the view that amendments inconsistent with the basic, un-
derlying values of the existing Constitution would be invalid, see, for example, JOHN
RAWLS,  PoLmcAL  LIBERALISM  239  (1993); Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past
and Future  Imperfect of the Once and Future  Polity, in RESPONDING  TO  IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY  AND  PRAGrICE  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT,  supra note 4, at 163; Walter
Dellinger,  The Legitimacy of Constitutional  Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97
H.Av. L. REv.  386 (1983).  For the opposing view, see John R. Vile,  The Case Against
Implicit Limits on the Constitutional  Amending Process, in RESPONDING TO  IMPERFECTION:
THE THEORY AND  PRACTmE OF  CONsrrTnoTAL AMENDMENT, supra note 4, at 191; Lau-
rence H. Tribe, A  Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained  Judicial  Role
97 HARv.  L. REv.  433  (1983).
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tive content that the super-majorities required by Article V happen to
prefer6I-in other words, that "We the People" possess a substantively
unlimited  lawmaking  power.62  Is  it  plausible  to  imagine  that  the
Supreme Court, when the presumption  for applying established rules
is  overcome,  possesses  a comparably  unbounded  lawmaking author-
ity?  I think not.  It seems most unlikely that Supreme  Court Justices
experience  themselves as possessing this kind of legally conferred  au-
thority.63  Vesting  such  power  in  the  Supreme  Court  would  seem
equally implausible as a matter of institutional  design.
A  second  analogy  would  be  to  a  legislature.  Legislatures  of
course  possess  lawmaking  powers,  but  those  lawmaking  powers  are
themselves bounded  by law  (the Constitution).  So  it might be with
the Supreme Court.  When the presumption for applying established
rules is overcome,  the Supreme Court might be empowered to craft a
new rule, but might continue to be subject to legal constraints. 64  The
Court might be required, for example, to provide a reasoned justifica-
tion of how its result comported with deep constitutional values taken
to be controlling.  Or it might be subject to felt requirements  not to
craft a rule that intruded excessively on the traditional prerogatives  of
another branch of government.  Or, to take a different kind of exam-
ple, it might regard itself as constrained not to rely on contested reli-
gious  premises as grounds for decision.
On this  view of the  Supreme  Court's  authority, the  Court, like
other lawmakers, would be bound, but not necessarily determined, by
law; and it might proceed frankly on the hypothesis that its authority
has an explicitly  lawmaking aspect.  Moreover,  on this view, it would
61  See U.S.  CoNsT. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two  thirds of both Houses shall deem it  necessary,
shall propose Amendments to the Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures  of two  thirds of the several  States, shall  call  a  Convention for
proposing Amendments,  which,  in  either Case,  shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified  by the Legislatures
of three fourths  of the several  States,  or by Conventions  in  three fourths
thereof, as  the one or the other Mode of Ratification  may be proposed  by
the Congress.
Id.
62  This  assumption,  which  I  make for purposes  of simplification,  is in  fact con-
tested, see supra note 60, and I mean  to take no stand on its ultimate validity.
63  Within the Hartian  framework that Schauer  generally accepts,  rules or prac-
tices of recognition  are identified by reference  to the behaviors  and attitudes of rele-
vant officials.  See HART,  supra note 45, at 144-50.
64  This  was  certainly  the view  of the most celebrated modern  positivist, H.Lj.
Hart, as he made clear in a postscript to the second edition of THE CONCEPT OF LAW,
supra note 45, at 272-74.
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perhaps not be as  odd as I suggested earlier for a legal system to au-
thorize its highest court, as a matter of law, to reject otherwise applica-
ble legal rules on occasions of high consequence.  Upon the bursting
of the positivist presumption, it would not be the case that the judges
could simply do as they thought best, whatever that might happen to
be.  The resulting authority or discretion would still be circumscribed
in ways that might seem acceptable  to a rule-making  authority  con-
cerned about allocating too much all-things-considered  decisionmak-
ing power to judges, including Justices  of the Supreme Court.
As I have suggested, I think an account such as this might be gen-
erally consistent with the theory of presumptive positivism,  as well  as
with Schauer's repeated  claim that a central function of legal rules is
to allocate power based on a distrust of those who, in the absence of
substantive  regulatory  rules,  would be required  to render  all-things-
considered decisions.65  On the other hand, I do not think that pre-
sumptive  positivism has  been  developed  sufficiently  for it to be  en-
tirely clear how the melding of my suggested account with Schauer's
theory might be  effected.  Somewhat more specifically,  I think pre-
sumptive positivism  needs a richer account  of the nature of and the
relationships among (i)  the substantive  legal rules  that are presump-
tively binding;  (ii)  the  second-order  rules  or norms  specifying  the
kinds of considerations to which those substantive rules may yield; and
(iii) the rules, norms, or practices that structure judicial decisionmak-
ing, especially  by highest courts, in  cases  in which  the presumption
calling  for  adherence  to  first-order  substantive  rules  is  overcome.
Were  Schauer  to  develop  presumptive  positivism  in  this  way,  my
strong suspicion is that the line between rule application and judicial
lawmaking would be blurred considerably in many of the cases  with
which he is most concerned,  as would the distinction between "pedi-
greed" legal norms and other social norms to which a judge can ap-
peal.66  Without pretending to develop a fully adequate account of my
own, I shall say a few more words about these matters below.
65  One sentence in Schauer's book, Playing  by the Rules, is especially suggestive  in
this  respect:  "When  a  decision-maker  makes  a  decision  based  on  only  a  limited
number of factors, that  decision-maker is  operating  in a world in which  rules have
allocated the determination of other factors to someone else or to some other person
or institution."  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULES,  supra note 2, at 231.
66  Cf HART, supra note 45, at 247 (recognizing that, under a positivist theory, "the
ultimate criteria of legal validity might explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, princi-
ples ofjustice or substantive moral values").  Schauer hints at the possibility that the
bursting of the presumption for rule-following does not mark a stark divide between,
on the one hand, cases in which judges are bound to follow the law and, on the other
hand,  cases  in which  their authority  to make  all-things-considered judgments  over-
runs the restraints and collapses the distinctions that the word "law" characteristically
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B.  Presumptive Positivism and the  "Limited Domain" Thesis
Although less than wholly satisfied with the account of the role of
rules  in American  law that is offered in Playing by  the Rules, I am sin-
cere  in  professing  admiration.  The  general  subject  area  is  one  in
which alternative  perspectives  and conceptualizations  seem  to me to
have illuminating capacity.  As I have suggested  already, the towering
influence  is  Dworkin,  whose  highly  idealized  account  suggests  that
every act of law application  depends at least implicitly on a legal the-
ory that takes account of all the principles reflected in a legal system's
entire  body  of law.67  If not  "argumentatively  impeccable,"68  Dwor-
kin's theory is at least plausible in its main outlines and elegantly ma-
jestic in scope.  But it also operates, by design and without apology, at
some distance from psychological and sociological  reality.69  For Her-
cules, Schauer substitutes more fallible decisionmakers with more rec-
ognizably  human  psychologies;  in  rules,  Schauer's  decisionmakers
find aid in  doing their jobs efficiently,  as well as  some comfort in  es-
caping a sense of personal responsibility  to perform refined, morally
freighted  calculations  in  every  case.  Focused  on  the experience  of
rules "in  law and in  life," Schauer at least illustrates that legal decision-
making  can profitably be  seen  from  angles  other than Dworkin's-
and maybe  that, in  describing what goes on, there  could be no fully
successful  separation of theory and data.
It  is less clear to me, however, that Schauer's account  of the na-
ture  of rules  and their characteristic functions  in  American  law con-
tributes usefully to the particular jurisprudential debate that he seems
most concerned to join.  This is the debate between proponents of a
marks.  See  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE  RULEs,  supra note  2,  at 205-06.  But, having
raised the question,  he declines to pursue it:
Whether we  call  [the]  array of overriding factors  [that sometimes allow the
displacement of otherwise  applicable  legal  rules]  "law"  or not is a dispute
that is to some extent terminological.  It is also a dispute, however, that goes
to the rhetoric of legality, to the extent to which  legal decision-makers  rely-
ing on a non-pedigreeable  universe of social norms shall when  doing so be
buttressed by the connotations of deduction, constraint, and limited domain
suggested  by the word  "law."  I will  explore this  question no further here,
and conclude this chapter only with  the descriptive assertion that presump-
tive positivism may be the most accurate picture of the place of rules within
many modem legal systems.
Id.
67  See DWORKIN,  LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra  note  23, at 225-58.
68  Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 671.
69  See DWORaN,  LAW's  EMPIRE,  supra note 23,  at 265  ("No doubt real judges de-
cide most cases in a much less methodical way.  But [the theoretical  construct of an
ideal judge]  shows us the hidden structure  of their judgments.").
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species  of "positive positivism" 70 and their opponents about whether,
as  a descriptive  matter,  law  consists  entirely of a  set of distinctively
"legal" rules and other norms that are sharply differentiated,  at least
in principle, from  the broader set of "social norms" extant within a
community.71  According  to  the  kind  of  positive  positivism  that
Schauer seems concerned to explicate, if not partly defend, "law" is a
"limited domain"72  of norms recognized  as such  by the  "the rule of
recognition" 73  or some  similar "pedigree" test that definitively sepa-
rates law from nonlaw.74  More pointedly, the positivism with which
Schauer  is  concerned  holds  that many  of the  norms  that are  com-
monly used in moral, political, and prudential arguments are not part
of the law, and can have no role in proper "legal" reasoning.
If I understand  his  point  correctly,  Schauer  believes  that pre-
sumptive positivism illustrates the partial truth of "positive positivism"
and the limited domain thesis in the following way:75 Insofar as rules
are not outweighed by supervening  considerations,  the central  claim
underlying  the limited domain  thesis holds;  the applicable  law  con-
sists solely of pedigreed rules, and a decisionmaker  is required to re-
spect the authority of those  rules.  Insofar,  however, as  determining
whether  the presumptive  authority of rules  is  overcome requires  re-
sort to all-things-considered  decisionmaking, and insofar as decision-
making after the presumption is defeated is similarly open-ended, the
limited domain  thesis is false.
70  SeeJules Coleman, Negative and Positive  Positivism, 11J. LEGAL STUD.  139  (1982);
Jules  Coleman,  Rules and Social Facts, 14  HARv. J.L. &  PUB.  POL'Y  703,  715  (1991).
According to Coleman, "negative  positivism"  denies that there is any necessary  con-
nection between law and morals, whereas "positive positivism" asserts some affirmative
claim about the actual or necessary nature of law.
71  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  By THE RULES, supra note  2, at 199.
72  See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 666-67,  670 n.49, 676.
73  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULES,  supra note 2, at 198.
74  As Schauer  explains:
[T]he heart of  positivism lies... in the concept of systemic isolation.  To the
positivist, there can be systems whose norms  are identified  by reference  to
some identifier  that can distinguish  legal norms from other norms, such as
those  of politics,  morality, economics,  or  etiquette.  This identifier, which
Hart refers to as the "rule of recognition" and Dworkin labels a "pedigree,"
picks out legal norms from the universe of other norms, and thus provides a
test for  legal validity.  If a  norm  is  so  selected,  it is  a  valid  legal  norm,
notwithstanding its moral repugnance, economic inconsistency, or political
folly.
Id. at 199;  see also Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 666.
75  See  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY  THE RULES,  supra note  2, at 204-06;  Schauer,  Rules,
supra note 3, at 678-79.
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This account seems to me less helpful, and possibly less accurate,
than Schauer appears  to think.  To begin with what may be a semantic
quibble  (and possibly one invited by my own attempt to reconstruct
Schauer's argument, rather than the argument itself),  I do not think
that Schauer has done anything to save or defend the limited domain
thesis.  On the contrary, if his account is accepted, the limited domain
thesis  is  false.  The  limited  domain  thesis,  in  the  terms  in  which
Schauer initially presents it, holds that "there is a limited  domain of
pedigreeable  legal  norms that is  not extensionally equivalent  to the
totality of then-available  social norms"76 and that "if there is a legally
pedigreed rule that applies to the case at hand, then it should be em-
ployed  to  produce  the  result."77  By  explicitly  recognizing  that
nonpedigreed  norms  can  sometimes  override  otherwise  applicable
pedigreed  norms, and by further acknowledging  that it takes at least
"a  peek"78  at  the  full  set  of  nonpedigreed  norms  to  determine
whether they are in fact overriding in any particular case, presumptive
positivism would most naturally be taken as  rejecting a central claim
of the limited  domain  thesis.
Schauer attempts  to rescue  part of the limited domain  thesis by
recasting  it in  psychological  terms: judges  frequently  experience  a
rule as binding, without conducting  the all-things-considered calcula-
tion necessary to determine whether it really is binding.79  He suggests
that it is  this  phenomenology,  rather  than  the  legal  ontology,  that
matters.80  I  am  doubtful,  however,  whether  Schauer's  phenomeno-
logical claim,  even if true, meets either the proponents or the oppo-
nents  of the  limited  domain  thesis  on  their  own  ground.  On  the
contrary,  the  psychological  experience  described  by Schauer  could
easily be cited  as part of an explanation  of how judges sometimes  err
in their  decisions:  they may fail to see that a "pedigreed" rule  is out-
weighed by a nonpedigreed consideration, when in fact, as a matter of
law, it is outweighed  (under a theory, such as Dworkin's, which holds
that what the  law is  or requires  cannot  be  determined  by exclusive
reference  to "pedigrees").81
76  Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 666 n.41.
77  SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RuLEs,  supra note 2, at 200.
78  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE  RuLEs,  supra note  2, at 204-05;  Schauer,  Rules,
supra note  3,  at 677.
79  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RuLEs,  supra  note  2,  at 204-05.
80  Schauer, Rules, supra note  3,  at 671-77.
81  Cf Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint  in Adjudication:  A  Critical  Phenome-
nology, 36J. LEGAL  EDUC.  518,  544-45 (1986)  (explaining how efforts  to imagine and
develop legal arguments can change ajudge's preliminary view about how a case must
be decided as a matter of law).
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In short, if Schauer's general account of the nature and functions
of regulatory  rules  is  true,  then  the  "limited domain"  thesis  is  not
partly true as a descriptive matter, but simply false.
III.  AMENDING  THE  PRESUPPOSITIONS  OF A CONSTITUTION
Among the  central  questions addressed  by contributors  to a re-
cent book, Responding  to Imperfection, 82.is whether it is possible for the
Constitution of the United States to be amended other than through
the devices provided  by Article V.  In influential writings  over more
than a decade,  Professors Bruce  Ackerman 83  and Akhil Arnar84  have
advanced  ingenious  arguments  that  the  specific  mechanisms  of
amendment referred to in Article V should not be viewed as constitu-
tionally exclusive.  In support of his interpretation, Ackerman, in par-
ticular, has  argued that a theory  treating the Article V amendment
mechanisms  as  nonexclusive  is  necessary  to  explain  how profound
changes  in  constitutional  understanding-such  as  those  associated
with the Supreme Court's  acceptance  of New Deal  constitutionalism
in  1937  and thereafter-could  be  constitutionally legitimate.85  On
the other side, a number of Article V "exclusivists"  maintain that the
amendment mechanisms  specifically  authorized  by the Constitution
provide the only constitutionally legitimate means of effecting consti-
tutional change.
86
In  his  article,  Amending  the  Presuppositions of  a  Constitution, 87
Schauer notes a crucial assumption that is seemingly shared by all par-
ticipants  in  the  ongoing  debate.  Both  "exclusivists"  and  "nonex-
clusivists"  assume  that  the  question  how  the  Constitution  may
legitimately  be  amended  must be  decided  by interpretation  of the
Constitution  itself; properly interpreted,  it either  does  or does  not
permit  amendment by means  other  than  those  specified  in Article
V.88  Having  identified  this  shared  assumption,  Schauer  very  in-
sightfully  challenges  it.  Building  on  Hans  Kelsen's  notion  of  a
82  See  RESPONDING  TO  IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  CONSTTEU-
TIONAL  AMENDMENT,  supra note 4.
83  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN,  1 WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS  (1991)  [hereinafter
AcRx--AN,  WE TmE PEOPLE]; Bruce Ackerman,  The Storrs  Lectures: Discovering  the Consti-
tution, 93 YALE L.J.  1013  (1984)  [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures].
84  See,  e.g.,  Akhil  Reed  Amar,  Philadelphia Revisited:  Amending  the  Constitution
Outside  Article V,  55 U. CHI. L. REv.  1043  (1988).
85  See ACKERMAN,  WE THE PEOPLE,  supra note 83; Ackerman,  Storr Lectures, supra
note 83.
86  See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 60;  Tribe, supra note 60.
87  Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,  supra note 4.
88  See id. at 146-47.
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"Grundnorm" and H.L.A. Hart's concept of a "rule of recognition," 8 9
Schauer argues  that the chain of legal justifications for our constitu-
tional practices must at some point run out.  The Constitution  is law,
not because  it says it  is, but because  relevant members of the society,
as a matter of social fact, accept it as such.90  The social fact of accept-
ance is, in Schauer's term, a "presupposition" of constitutionalism and
of debates about what is legitimate  "under" the  Constitution.  But if
the social fact  of acceptance  ultimately makes  the Constitution  law,
acceptance  also  ultimately  determines  what  the  Constitution  is. 91
Once  this is recognized, Schauer  continues, it  becomes  obvious that
what we accept as "the Constitution" need not be perfectly coextensive
with the words inscribed in the printed Constitution.  Then comes his
conclusion:
The process of constitutional amendment, therefore, can  take
place on one of two  levels.  On the constitutional  level, it can  take
place within the contours of the constitution  itself....  But because
constitutions owe their "constitutionality" to logically and politically
antecedent  conditions,  the  process  of constitutional  amendment
may also take place at another level, when these logically and politi-
cally antecedent  conditions are themselves amended.92
Schauer's effort to focus attention on the context of constitution-
alism-the context in which constitutional  amendment and constitu-
tional  interpretation  are  possible,  and  in  which  debates  about
amendment and interpretation are meaningful-marks  an important
advance.  Debates  about  the  possibility  of  constitutional  "amend-
ment,"  as  opposed  to revolution  or replacement,  make  sense  only
within a functioning legal system.  Moreover, the "practices" of recog-
nition that are the logical antecedents of legal validity within our legal
system are complex and diverse. 93  We recognize or accept the written
document called  "the Constitution" as law, but we  also appear to  ac-
cept as  authoritative-as  definitive  of the  Constitution's  meaning-
any sociologically  plausible decision rendered by the Supreme Court.
In other words, it  is part of our practice  to accept as constitutionally
valid  (or invalid)  nearly  anything  that the  Supreme  Court, at least
89  See id. at 149-52.  By his  own account,  Schauer draws primarily on  HANS  KEL-
SEN,  GENERAL  THEORY OF LAW  AND  STATE  115-36  (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961),  and
HART,  supra note 45, at 97-114, 245-47.
90  See Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,  supra note 4, at  152-53.
91  See id. at 153-57.
92  Id. at 160-61.
93  See Kent  Greenawalt,  The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85  MICH.  L.
REV.  621  (1987).
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when  acting within  sociologically  established  bounds  of plausibility,
says is valid  (or invalid).
Because the general public seems so accepting of the interpretive
authority asserted by the Supreme  Court, and so disposed to equate
"the meaning" of the Constitution with the Supreme Court's interpre-
tations  of it, the most crucial  question for many practical  purposes
involves  the practices  of recognition  of the Justices  of the Supreme
Court.  Suppose,  then,  that  the  question  is  whether-to  translate
Bruce Ackerman's question into the terms that Schauer commends-
the presuppositions  of American  constitutionalism were amended in
the  1930s so that, among other things, certain restrictions on govern-
mental regulation under "constitutional" provisions  such as  the Due
Process and Contracts  Clauses would no longer be recognized as part
of the Constitution binding as law.
If we were to seek an answer to this question in the practices  of
the Justices of the Supreme  Court, I think it would quickly become
apparent  that the  question  could  not be  answered  in  the  form  in
which  it was put.  In  one sense, the Court  continues to "accept" the
same  Constitution  (in  relevant  respects)  that  existed  before  1937.
Aside from subsequently ratified "formal" amendments, the words in
what is universally taken to be the canonical inscription of the Consti-
tution remain the same;  any competent legal  opinion must state  or
presuppose  a  theory  that reconciles  the  conclusion  that  is  reached
with  the words of the text.  In another sense, however, the purposes
and demands of the Due Process and Contracts Clauses, for example,
are  typically  described  differently  than they were before.  Different,
mid-level principles  or tests  are viewed  as capturing these provisions'
meanings.  In addition, precedent  has accreted,  and many cases  will
be resolved on the basis of precedent, with direct argument over first
principles-over  the  question  whether  the  precedents  have  under-
stood the Constitution correctly-occurring  only rarely.94
To my mind, however, the crucial point would be that we make
something like a category mistake if we press the question whether a
change in the way that the Supreme  Court interprets the Constitution
amends the Constitution.  Schauer equates the presuppositions of con-
stitutionalism with social fact.  But Supreme  Court interpretive  prac-
tice cannot be put into any simple category of social fact; interpretive
94  See David Strauss,  Common Law Constitutional  Interpretation,  63 U.  CHI.  L. REv.
877 (1996).
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norms themselves call for justification,95 and what will count as an ad-
equate justification depends  (in the first instance  at least)  on shared
understandings  that help  to  constitute  the  relatively familiar  frame-
work  of  constitutional  discourse.96   By  contrast,  constitutional
"amendment," as that term is most naturally and usefully understood,
needs  to be justified within  a different political practice  and a corre-
spondingly  different  framework  of discourse. 97  Amendment,  unlike
interpretation,  may need no substantive justification whatsoever  as a
matter of law; formal satisfaction of constitutionally prescribed proce-
dural requirements  may suffice.
The same point can be put in a different way.  Within the practice
of American  constitutionalism,  it is presupposed  that the criteria for
constitutional  identity or sameness  generally are  satisfied  in  the ab-
sence of a written alteration of the written text.  We have  the "same"
Constitution that we had in 1936, explicit amendments  aside, despite
enormous  changes  in  our understanding  of what  the  Constitution
95  Cf Lawrence  Lessig,  What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to Imperfec-
tion?,  74 TEX. L. REV. 839, 860-69  (1996)  (arguing that the "presuppositions" of consti-
tutional argument require justification).
96  For a sophisticated account of the nature and processes ofjustification  in law,
see  DENNIS  PArTERSON,  LAW  AND  TRUTH  (1996).
97  But see Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution  Been
Amended?  (A)  <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting  for Constitutional  Change, in  RE-
SPONDING  TO  IMPERFECrION:  THE  THEORY AND  PRAaCICE  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  AMEND-
MENT,  supra note 4, at 13  (arguing that constitutional "amendments" can and should
be differentiated  from constitutional "interpretations" by reference  to whether they
can be "derived" from the previously existing constitutional text in light of accepted
interpretive conventions and by the degree of substantive change that they introduce
into constitutional  law).  I agree with Professor Levinson  that some developments in
constitutional  doctrine  are  sufficiently discontinuous  with  previous understandings
that they ideally should be effected through constitutional amendment, if at all.  Nor
am I unsympathetic, in principle,  to his effort to develop  a vocabulary to distinguish
such  changes from the kind of elaboration or adjustment associated with  "ordinary"
constitutional  interpretation.  I fear,  however,  that only  confusion  will follow  from
using the term "amendment" to embrace doctrinal discontinuities arising solely from
judicial decisionmaking,  as well  as discontinuities  arising from a formal  alteration of
the constitutional text pursuant to Article V. Among other things, alterations arising
from Article V procedures  possess both a democratic legitimacy and a textually based
claim  to immunity from judicial reconsideration  that comparably revolutionary judi-
cial  decisions do not.
This objection  would apply with  somewhat less force  against a theory, such  as
Bruce Ackerman's, that sharply distinguished between "formal amendments" and "in-
formal  amendments"  and that established  criteria for participation  by "We  the Peo-
ple,"  not  merely  courts,  in  the  process  necessary  for "informal  amendments'-as
opposed to  judge-driven  doctrinal revolutions-to occur.  SeeAcKERMAN,  WE THE PEO-
PLE,  supra note 83; Ackerman,  Storrs Lectures, supra note 83.
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means98-just  as,  for example,  Bill  Clinton holds "the same" office
that  George  Washington  held,  even  though  there  have  been  enor-
mous changes  in  the scope of presidential  duties and powers.
Schauer  is  right, of course,  that  changes  in  what he  calls  the
presuppositions of constitutionalism-which  is to say, changes in  the
complex network  of practices  through which the Constitution  is rec-
ognized  as  law, interpreted,  and  enforced-will  inevitably,  and not
necessarily illegitimately,  produce  changes  in  prevailing understand-
ings of what the  Constitution forbids or requires.  This  an important
point for anyone who  wants to understand American  constitutional-
ism,99 and it should not be overlooked by those interested in  processes
,of  constitutional amendment.  Nonetheless, a changed understanding
of the written Constitution is not itself an "amendment" of the Consti-
tution;  changed  understandings  are  subject  to a  kind  of legitimacy
challenge  that  constitutional  amendments  are not. 00  If  we  want  a
better  understanding  of the  relationship  between  changed  under-
standings and constitutional amendments,  we will do well to begin by
keeping them conceptually distinct, if only to make possible both con-
trast and comparison.
IV.  DICHOTOMOUS  THEORIZING
The problem with a sharply dichotomous theory of constitutional
amendments  parallels  that  with  presumptive  positivism:  within  our
98  See,  e.g.,  Charles  Fried,  The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revolutions?,
109  HARv. L.  REv.  13, 33  (1995).
99  For example, as the extensive literature on constitutional "originalism" makes
clear, our constitutional  law has departed  from "original understandings"  in many
crucial areas.  See, e.g.,  ROBERT  H. BORK,  THE TEMPTING  OF  AMERICA:  Tim  PoLTICAL
SEDUCTION  OF THE LAW 19-128 (1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Consti-
tutional  Adjudication  88 COLUM.  L. REv.  723, 727-39  (1988).  Moreover,  as Schauer's
analytical apparatus usefully helps to demonstrate, there is nothing necessarily "illegit-
imate" about this  development.  Legal "legitimacy" must ultimately be  measured at
least partly  by reference  to  norms  that, as a  matter of social  fact,  are accepted  as
legally controlling.  Indeed, I think the argument can be  pressed further:  The rele-
vant norms within our society could, and I would argue do, both validate (some) non-
originalist interpretation as legally "legitimate" and, what is more, sometimes call for
reference  to  explicitly  moral  considerations  in resolving interpretive  questions, in-
cluding interpretive  questions about how contested interpretive norms are appropri-
ately specified.  If so, it is a contingent fact about the American legal system that the
question  what the  governing interpretive  norms  actually are  is partly a question  of
political morality.  It is also a contingent fact that debates about what the governing
interpretive  norms ought to be is at least partly internal to constitutional  law.
100  SeeLessig, supra note 95, at 860-69 (arguing that the significance of alterations
in the presuppositions of constitutional practice is largely a normative, not a positive
question).
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legal  system,  there is no sharp  divide between  applying  or specifying
the content of legal norms, on the one hand, and abandoning or al-
tering  them  in service  of extra-legal  norms  on  the  other.  To  this
claim, Schauer might object that his aim is to enhance understanding
precisely by drawing analytical distinctions that cut against the grain of
what is  usually  thought.  But this  response, I  think, would be  a mis-
take.  In my view, the great strength of Schauer's jurisprudential work
is as what Hart called "descriptive sociology."10'  His interest is in how
rules  work,  in life  and  the legal  system,  not just in adjudication. 1 0 2
Analyzed from this perspective, the legal system in general is a device
for the allocation of power within a society, and adjudication by high-
est courts is just one aspect of this device.  As  a matter of descriptive
sociology, courts-dangerous  though they may be-remain "the least
dangerous  branch" 03  within the American  legal system.  A good de-
scriptive sociology must, I think, explain in fuller detail how the  con-
geries  of forces  underlying  what  Hart  called  "rules  of recognition"
help to maintain this dynamic equilibrium  as a matter of law.
V.  PRESUPPOSITIONS,  MEANING,  AND  PRESUMPTIVE  POSITIVISM
Although I have criticized Amending the Presuppositions  of a Consti-
tution, it should be clear that I agree totally with what I take to be its
main point: what the law is ultimately depends on practices of accept-
ance not all of which, as a logical matter, can themselves be justified as
a matter of law.  I am uncertain, however, how the implications of this
position  relate to some of the claims  about the nature of legal rules
advanced in Playing  by the Rules.  In Playing  by the Rules, Schauer asserts
that the meaning of legal  rules is given by relatively acontextual rules
of semantics. 1 0 4  To know the meaning of a legal rule-or whether,
for example,  it applies  to particular facts-our  principal  touchstone
must be whether the words in which  the  rule is  expressed  would be
understood  as subsuming those facts by a competent speaker of Eng-
lish with little or no awareness of the specific context in which the rule
was propounded  or its application  was being considered.
In  Amending  the  Presuppositions of  a  Constitution, by  contrast,
Schauer is at least saying that the asserted status of a norm as a legal
norm cannot be determined "acontexually" in any plausible  sense of
101  HART,  supra note 45, at v-vi.
102  Cf Schauer,  Rules, supra note 3,  at 671  (rejecting accounts ofjudicial decision-
making that are "argumentatively impeccable" on the ground that they are "phenom-
enologically false").
103  See THE  FEDERALIST  No. 78  (Alexander Hamilton).
104  See SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RuLEs,  supra note 2, at 53-62, 207-18.
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that term, but instead requires examination of social facts.  And if this
is  so, it would seem to follow that the meaning of a legal norm must
also depend on matters of social fact-on what the rule, or rules of a
similar kind,  are accepted  as  meaning within the legal practice  of a
particular  society.  The alternative  view, that rules must either be ac-
cepted  as bearing their "acontextual" meaning or not be accepted at
all, would be a claim about the "necessary" nature of law that seems
implausible  on its face.
If, however,  the meaning of legal norms depends  on the rules,
conventions,  or  understandings  of a  society's  legal  practice,  it be-
comes plausible to think that legal "meaning" is not as relatively acon-
textual as Schauer suggests in Playing  ly the Rules.1 0 5  More pointedly, it
becomes plausible to think that a legal rule saying "no driving over 55
miles per hour," when properly interpreted, simply does not apply to
a vehicle rushing a heart attack victim to the hospital.  On this view,
the  appropriate  characterization  is not, as  Schauer's  theory  of pre-
sumptive positivism would suggest, that the rule  must yield to super-
vening social norms of very great weight. The point, rather, would be
that the meaning of the rule, in law, depends on actual and ascribed
purposes in light of common understandings, assumptions about the
bounds  of reasonableness,  and the surrounding body of law.
In  offering  this  suggestion,  which  seems  to  me  to  be  invited
(though not entailed) by Amending the Presuppositions  of  a Constitution,  I
do not mean  to deny Schauer's point that the jurisdictional rules  of
our legal practice may sometimes authorize judges to go beyond what
could  fairly be  characterized  as  "interpretation" and  to  displace  or
modify legal  rules in the service  of other norms.  I merely mean to
suggest that "legal meaning" may diverge in important ways from rela-
tively  acontextual  linguistic meaning  and that the bounds  of "legal
interpretation"  may  therefore  be  somewhat  broader  than  Schauer
suggests.
Again,  Schauer  might  object that  his  account  has  clarificatory
power  that my  suggested  alternative  does  not. Again,  however,  my
guess would be that the "phenomenology" is on my side, not his-that
judges, lawyers, and other participants in the legal system much more
commonly  experience  themselves  as struggling  to support an  "inter-
pretation" that they find acceptable  than as struggling over the ques-
105  Cf Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,  supra note 4, at 160  ("A society could,
for example, shift from a literal to a nonliteral understanding of its  [constitutional]
amendment provisions, and given the prevalence of nonformal and nonliteral modes
of legal and constitutional interpretation in the United States, this may in fact be what
has happened.").
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tion whether a rule should be displaced or amended to avoid socially
unacceptable  consequences.  Such  an  understanding,  in  turn,  may
again  be  relevant  to  the  psychological  and sociological  forces  that
maintain the judiciary as "the least dangerous branch."
VI.  CONCLUSION
Unsystematic  ruminations  could  scarcely  do justice  to  Fred
Schauer's rich body of work, and I do not pretend to have done so.  I
would  conclude by calling  attention  to a matter of intellectual  style
that  may  help  to  explain  some  of  the  disagreements  that  I  have
expressed.
Throughout his legal, philosophical, and jurisprudential writings,
Schauer characteristically propounds bold theses.  Once the tangle  of
familiar  arguments  and  confusions  is  sorted  through,  he  presents
sharp, provocative claims about how things either are or ought to be.
Schauer's sharply etched  conclusions  reflect a distinctive  intellectual
approach, which I assume  reflects a belief that bold, memorable  gen-
eralizations are likely to be more helpful in organizing thought than
more  complex  and  qualified  claims  that are  difficult to  remember,
apply, or test.  My  own  intellectual  style  tends in the opposite  direc-
tion-as the ruminations  offered in  this  essay may  abundantly illus-
trate.  It may be a small indication of the power of Schauer's work that
it consistently challenges and engages even someone with so different
a cast of mind.
In any  event, as I  suggested at the  outset, many of my quarrels
with  Schauer's  views  about particular  issues  have  resulted  from  my
grappling  with  his  equally  provocative  and  important  positions  on
other topics.  His contributions to legal scholarship are many and vari-
ous,  and no one who cares about legal  theory can afford to take his
work other than seriously.
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